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Uneven “Neutrality”: Dual Standards and the
Establishment Clause in Johnson v. Poway
I. INTRODUCTION
“May a school district censor a high school teacher’s expression
because it refers to Judeo-Christian views while allowing other
teachers to express views on a number of controversial subjects, including religion and anti-religion?”1 In 2010, a federal district court
held that a school district may not.2 In 2011, the Ninth Circuit held
otherwise.3
The case that produced these contrary rulings, Johnson v. Poway
Unified School District, involved a high school teacher’s claim that
the school district he worked for had violated the Free Speech and
Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The school district
had ordered the teacher to remove two banners from his classroom
wall because they contained references to God while allowing other
teachers to exhibit noncurricular classroom displays, many of which
featured religious themes and other potentially controversial subject
matter.
The Establishment Clause requires government neutrality toward
religion,4 but the Ninth Circuit focused on potential problems with
the teacher’s display and justifications for other similar displays. This
resulted in content-based religious discrimination rather than the
neutrality the Establishment Clause requires. For that reason, Johnson was wrongly decided and should be overturned.
This Note will proceed as follows. Part II provides a brief overview of Establishment Clause jurisprudence as it relates to government-sponsored religious displays. Part III summarizes Johnson v.
Poway, including the facts of the case, the district court opinion, and
the Ninth Circuit’s reversal. Part IV analyzes the Ninth Circuit’s de-

1. Johnson v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., No. 07cv783 BEN (NLS), 2010 WL 768856,
at *1 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2010) [hereinafter Johnson I].
2. Id.
3. See Johnson v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 658 F.3d 954, 957 (9th Cir. 2011) [hereinafter Johnson II].
4. See infra note 7.
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cision, discussing the similarities between two displays involved in
the case, the different standards applied to each display, and how
these dual standards brought about a discriminatory result. Part V
concludes that the Ninth Circuit’s ruling is problematic because it
potentially discriminates against specific religious viewpoints, thus
violating the First Amendment.
II. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND RELIGIOUS DISPLAYS
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment states that
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.”5 This clause applies to the states under the Fourteenth
Amendment.6 Since the 1980s, the Supreme Court has interpreted
the Establishment Clause to require religious neutrality rather than
strict separation of church and state.7 Simply put, “government must
not take sides between particular religions or denominations, or between belief or unbelief.”8
Establishment Clause cases, which often involve challenges to
government-sponsored religious displays, have been fairly inconsistent9 because of the Supreme Court’s inability to articulate a test that
yields fair and predictable results.10 In 1971, the Supreme Court attempted to establish such a test.11 Under what has become known as
the Lemon test, government actions touching on religion must
1) “have a secular legislative purpose,” 2) have a “primary effect . . .

5. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
6. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
7. Frederick Mark Gedicks, Undoing Neutrality? From Church-State Separation to Judeo-Christian Tolerance, 46 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 691, 695 (2010).
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1811 (2010) (permitting a legislative
land transfer to a private party to preserve a previously enjoined Latin cross on federal land);
McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 881 (2005) (finding a display of the Ten Commandments in a county courthouse unconstitutional); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 681
(2005) (finding a display of the Ten Commandments on state capitol grounds constitutional);
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 579 (1989) (finding a nativity scene at the
county courthouse unconstitutional and a menorah constitutional); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U.S. 668, 671–72 (1984) (finding a nativity scene constitutional as part of a municipal
Christmas display).
10. See, e.g., RonNell Andersen Jones, Pick Your Poison: Private Speech, Government
Speech, and the Special Problem of Religious Displays, 2010 BYU L. REV. 2045, 2045–46
(2010).
11. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971).
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that neither advances nor inhibits religion,” and 3) “not foster ‘an
excessive government entanglement with religion.’”12
Then, in a 1984 concurrence, Justice O’Connor proposed what
has become known as the endorsement test,13 which the Court
adopted as “the standard by which future religious display cases
should be judged.”14 The endorsement test is essentially a modified
Lemon test, combining the purpose and effect prongs and eliminating the entanglement prong.15 Under the endorsement test, a government-sponsored religious display violates the Establishment
Clause if it “has the effect of endorsing religion”16—either because
the government “subjectively intends to endorse or disapprove religion,” although its actions may not actually have that effect, or because government action is “reasonably understood to endorse or
disapprove religion,” although such an effect may not have been intended.17
III. JOHNSON V. POWAY
Although the dispute in Johnson v. Poway centers on religious displays, it is not a typical religious monument case. Rather than addressing a more blatant incident of government appropriation of re-

12. Id. (citing Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)). The Lemon test
has been criticized, sometimes vigorously. See, e.g., Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union
Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Like some ghoul in a latenight horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again.”); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 110 (1985) (“The three-part test has simply not provided adequate standards for deciding Establishment Clause cases.”); Josh Blackman, This Lemon Comes
as a Lemon: The Lemon Test and the Pursuit of a Statute’s Secular Purpose, 20 GEO. MASON U.
C.R. L.J. 351, 357–58 (2010). Nevertheless, the Court continues to apply the test. See
McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 859–65. Justice Scalia cynically suggests that the Lemon test owes
its staying power to its usefulness in arriving at conclusions the Court prefers. See Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 399 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“When we wish to strike down a practice it forbids, we invoke it; when we wish to uphold a practice it forbids, we ignore it entirely.”) (citations omitted).
13. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688–690 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring);
Susanna Dokupil, “Thou Shalt Not Bear False Witness”: “Sham” Secular Purposes in Ten Commandments Displays, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 609, 620–21 (2005).
14. Dokupil, supra note 13, at 621. See also Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 597.
15. 328 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 438 (2011).
16. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 595.
17. See FREDERICK MARK GEDICKS, THE RHETORIC OF CHURCH AND STATE 73
(1995).
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ligious symbols,18 such as a municipality displaying a nativity,19 Johnson concerns a school district’s decision to prevent a high school
math teacher from maintaining a display on his classroom walls despite a district-wide policy of allowing teachers to display noncurricular messages of their choice.
A. Factual Background
The plaintiff, Bradley Johnson, was a high school math teacher
and faculty sponsor of a student Christian club20 and had taught in
the Poway School District in San Diego, California, since 1977.21
Five years after he began teaching, Johnson hung a red, white, and
blue banner on his classroom wall that measured seven feet by two
feet and featured four phrases: “In God We Trust,” “One Nation
Under God,” “God Bless America,” and “God Shed His Grace On
Thee.”22 Eight years later, Johnson hung a second banner—similar
to the first in size and appearance—that contained the following
quote from the Declaration of Independence: “All Men Are Created
Equal, They Are Endowed By Their Creator.”23 On this second banner, the word creator was given its own line, on which it was printed
in capital letters approximately twice the size of the other text.24
Johnson placed both banners in his classroom in accordance with
the school district’s policy of allowing teachers “to display on their
classroom walls messages and other items that reflect the teacher’s
personality, opinions, and values, as well as political and social concerns . . . so long as the wall display does not materially disrupt
school work or cause substantial disorder or interference in the classroom.”25 Under this policy, teachers throughout the district used
their classroom walls to display posters, banners, bumper stickers and

18. See Gedicks, supra note 7, at 696.
19. See McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 881 (2005); Van Orden v. Perry, 545
U.S. 677, 681 (2005).
20. See Johnson II, 658 F.3d 954, 958 (9th Cir. 2011).
21. Id.; HS Teacher Told to Remove ‘God’ Banners by Federal Court, 10NEWS.COM
(Sept. 14, 2011), http://www.10news.com/news/29181371/detail.html.
22. Johnson II, 658 F.3d at 958; Johnson I, No. 07cv783 BEN (NLS), 2010 WL
768856, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2010).
23. Johnson I, 2010 WL 768856, at *2.
24. Johnson II, 658 F.3d at 958.
25. Johnson I, 2010 WL 768856, at *9.
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other items with cultural, political, and religious messages.26 In this
environment, Johnson displayed his banners “in some form or
another” without objection until 2006.27
Johnson began teaching at a new high school within the district
in 2003.28 In 2006, a colleague asked the school principal about the
banners in Johnson’s classroom.29 The principal visited Johnson’s
classroom, where she saw the banners, apparently for the first time,
and was “surprised” and “overwhelmed” by what she saw.30 She later
testified that while the phrases on Johnson’s banners were “not
problematic at all” when read alone or in context, she was concerned
that Johnson’s presentation promoted a religious viewpoint that
might make some students uncomfortable.31
The principal consulted with the assistant superintendent, who
investigated the banners and reported to the school board.32 The
school board ordered Johnson to remove the banners because the
phrases they displayed had a “combined influence that ‘overemphasized’ God.”33 The principal suggested that Johnson modify
his display by providing additional context (for example, by displaying the entire Declaration of Independence rather than just the parts
that refer to God).34 Johnson refused,35 and in January 2007, the assistant superintendent ordered Johnson to remove the banners.36
Johnson complied with the orders.37

26. Id. at *3–4 (providing an extensive list of displays found on teachers’ walls throughout the school district, including the following displays with explicitly or arguably religious
elements: Tibetan prayer flags, a John Lennon poster with lyrics to the song “Imagine,” a
poster of Mahatma Gandhi (a “Hindu leader”) and a poster of Gandhi’s “7 Social Sins,” a
poster of the Dali Lama (a “Buddhist leader”), a poster referring to hell, and a poster of Malcolm X (a “Muslim minister”)).
27. See id. at *4; Johnson II, 658 F.3d at 959.
28. Johnson II, 658 F.3d at 958.
29. Id. The district court opinion implies that the colleague had hostile motives, noting
that he “may have disagreed with Johnson over pedagogy.” See Johnson I, 2010 WL 768856,
at *4.
30. Johnson II, 658 F.3d at 958.
31. Id.
32. Johnson I, 2010 WL 768856, at *4.
33. Id.
34. Johnson II, 658 F.3d at 958–59.
35. Id. at 959.
36. Johnson I, 2010 WL 768856, at *4–5.
37. Johnson II, 658 F.3d at 959.
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B. The District Court Opinion
After removing his banners, Johnson sued the school district in
federal court,38 claiming violations of the Constitution’s Free Speech
Clause,39 Establishment Clause,40 and Equal Protection Clause,41 as
well as corresponding sections of the California state constitution.42
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Johnson on
all claims.
In its opinion, the district court concentrated primarily on Johnson’s free speech claims.43 Focusing on the school district’s policy of
allowing teachers to “express ideas on their classroom walls,” the
court held that the district’s policy had created a “limited public forum.”44 Therefore, only “viewpoint neutral” regulation of speech
was permissible.45 Noting that the school district allowed other
teachers to use their classroom walls to express opinions “on a wide
variety of secular and religious topics,”46 the court concluded that
the school district had “singled out [Johnson’s speech] for suppression because of its [Judeo-Christian] message,” thereby violating
Johnson’s First Amendment right to free speech.47
Regarding Johnson’s Establishment Clause claim, the district
court held that the school district’s policies were “not neutral toward
teachers’ religious displays.”48 Specifically, the school district had violated the Establishment Clause through the “endorsement of
Buddhist, Hindu, and anti-religious speech by some teachers while
silencing the Judeo-Christian speech of Johnson.”49
Finally, the court held that the school district violated Johnson’s
rights to equal protection by limiting his speech “based on the content and viewpoint of what he was expressing—while at the same

38. Id.
39. Johnson I, 2010 WL 768856, at *5.
40. Id. at *5, *18.
41. Id. at *5, *20.
42. Id. at *5.
43. See id. at *5–18.
44. Id. at *9.
45. Id.
46. Id. at *10. Other teachers hung banners and posters involving Buddhism, Hinduism, and “anti-religious speech.” Id.
47. Id. at *10–11.
48. Id. at *19.
49. Id.
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time permitting other teacher speech from a variety of other viewpoints . . . .”50
C. The Ninth Circuit’s Reversal
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court on all
points.51 First, the Ninth Circuit concluded that because Johnson’s
claim involved a government restriction on speech by a government
employee, the district court incorrectly applied a “forum-based analysis.”52 Instead, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Johnson’s claim
failed because he “spoke as an employee, not as a citizen.”53 Because
Johnson spoke as an employee, his speech was government speech
rather than private speech. Consequently, because the First Amendment does not restrict government regulation of government speech,
the court held that the school district “acted well within constitutional limits in ordering Johnson not to speak in a manner it did not
desire.”54
The court then considered Johnson’s claims under the Establishment Clause, which, unlike the Free Speech Clause, does apply to
government speech.55 The court treated Johnson’s claim as two related claims: first, that the school district had allegedly shown hostility to Judeo-Christian beliefs by ordering Johnson to remove his
banners, and second, that the school district had supposedly endorsed other religious beliefs by allowing other teachers to maintain

50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at *21.
Johnson II, 658 F.3d 954, 958 (9th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 961.
Id. at 964. The Ninth Circuit based its conclusion on a five-step Pickering analysis:
(1) whether the plaintiff spoke on a matter of public concern; (2) whether the
plaintiff spoke as a private citizen or public employee; (3) whether the plaintiff’s
protected speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse employment action; (4) whether the state had an adequate justification for treating the
employee differently from other members of the general public; and (5) whether
the state would have taken the adverse employment action even absent the protected speech.

Id. at 961 (quoting Eng v. Cooley, 552 F.3d 1062, 1070 (9th Cir. 2009)). However, having
concluded that Johnson spoke as a public employee, the court ended the analysis without addressing the final three factors. Id. at 964.
54. Id. at 970.
55. Id.
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their displays.56 Examining each claim separately, the court concluded that the school district had not violated the Establishment
Clause.57
First, the court concluded that the school district did not violate
the Establishment Clause by ordering the removal of Johnson’s banners because, as government speech, the banners “would raise at
least the possibility of an Establishment Clause claim” against the
school.58 By removing the banners, the school district was pursuing a
valid secular purpose of avoiding Establishment Clause violations and
maintaining religious neutrality.59
Second, the Court concluded that the other displays with religious elements merely had “some religious connotation.”60 Because
the other displays were not used to “endorse or inhibit religion,” the
district did not violate the Establishment Clause by permitting
them.61
Regarding Johnson’s equal protection claim, the court held that
“[b]ecause Johnson had no individual right to speak for the government,” he had no claim.62 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit determined
that none of Johnson’s constitutional claims succeeded.
IV. ANALYSIS
The correctness of the Ninth Circuit’s holding that there was no
Free Speech Clause issue because Johnson’s banners were government speech is beyond the scope of this Note.63 But even accepting
the court’s Free Speech Clause conclusion as correct, Johnson was
56. Id. at 971.
57. Id. at 974.
58. Id. at 973.
59. See id. at 971.
60. Id. at 973.
61. The Court specifically mentioned posters of Gandhi, the Dalai Lama, and Malcolm
X; a poster with the lyrics to John Lennon’s song “Imagine”; and a string of Tibetan prayer
flags. Id.
62. Id. at 975.
63. At least one First Amendment scholar disagrees with the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion.
See Eugene Volokh, A Rare First Amendment Victory for a Public School Teacher Complaining
About Restrictions on In-School Speech, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Feb. 26, 2010, 6:39 PM),
http://volokh.com/2010/02/26/a-rare-first-amendment-victory-for-a-public-schoolteacher-complaining-about-restrictions-on-in-school-speech (“[T]he highly unusual policy of
the school district . . . probably does create a designated public forum for the teachers’ own
messages.”). The court’s holding on Johnson’s equal protection claim rests on the Free Speech
Clause conclusion.
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decided incorrectly. Johnson should have prevailed on the strength
of his religious discrimination claim. By ordering Johnson to remove
his banners from his classroom while allowing other teachers to
maintain their displays, Poway School District violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
The issue in Johnson was not the constitutionality of either Johnson’s display or the displays of other teachers. Rather, it was the constitutionality of Poway School District’s treatment of these displays.
The Ninth Circuit erroneously divided Johnson’s Establishment
Clause claim into two separate claims and ignored the combined effect of Poway School District’s actions. Instead, the court applied
one standard to Johnson’s banners and another standard to other
displays throughout the school district, thus failing to enforce the
ideal of neutrality that the Establishment Clause requires. Had the
Ninth Circuit applied the same standard to the school district’s
treatment of all of the exhibits, the result would have been uniform
and constitutional. Instead, the court applied different standards
which produced inconsistent results that a reasonable observer could
interpret as hostility to one religion and preference to others. This
renders the school district’s actions unconstitutional regardless of
whether the district intended that effect.
To best illustrate the court’s error, this section will focus on the
court’s treatment of two displays: Johnson’s banners and the Tibetan
prayer flags. Part A describes the similarities between the two displays, reinforcing the conclusion that the court had no reason for
judging the two displays by different standards. Part B argues that
the prayer flags raised the same potential threat of an Establishment
Clause violation that Johnson’s banners did. Part C argues that
Johnson’s banners were no more coercive than the prayer flags.
A. Comparing Classroom Displays
The Ninth Circuit concluded that Johnson’s banners plainly
conveyed a religious message.64 In contrast, “an objective observer
could [not] conclude that the [prayer] flags were displayed for a religious purpose.”65 However, the distinction between the two displays

64. See Johnson II, 658 F.3d at 965.
65. Id. at 974.
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was negligible66 because both displays contained plainly religious
elements and both had plausible secular reasons for their displays.
Johnson’s banners undeniably contained religious elements—
they explicitly referred to God five times. But references to God do
not change the fact that the text has secular origins.67 The religious
elements of Johnson’s banners do not invalidate Johnson’s claim that
the banners are patriotic and “highlight the religious heritage and
nature of our nation.”68
The teacher who displayed the prayer flags testified that the flags
were associated with climbing Mount Everest and represented “accomplishing ‘an amazing goal.’”69 But her use of the flags to “stimulate the interest of her students” when discussing fossils near Mount
Everest70 does not change the fact that the prayer flags are religious
artifacts:71 Tibetan prayer flags are physical manifestations of prayers,72 and the flags on display in the classroom are printed with images of Buddha.73
One important difference between the two displays is that one
represents a majority religion and the other a minority religion. But
this difference does not warrant judicial application of different standards to evaluate their permissibility under the Establishment Clause.

66. The most obvious similarities between the displays are physical. See Johnson I, No.
07cv783 BEN (NLS), 2010 WL 768856, at *18. Johnson’s banners and the prayer flags are
both large and prominently displayed in their respective classrooms. Johnson’s two banners
each measure approximately seven feet by two feet and hung on the walls of Johnson’s classroom. Johnson II, 658 F.3d at 958. The string of Tibetan prayer flags “span[ned] the 35–40
foot width of a classroom.” Johnson I, 2010 WL 768856, at *10.
67. Id. at *2 (noting that Johnson’s first banner features “famous national phrases” and
that “[t]he second banner quotes from the Declaration of Independence”).
68. Johnson II, 658 F.3d at 960.
69. Id. at 974.
70. Id. at 973–74.
71. See Johnson I, 2010 WL 768856, at *19.
72. Donald S. Lopez, Jr., A Prayer Flag for Tara, in RELIGIONS OF TIBET IN PRACTICE
548 (Donald S. Lopez, Jr. ed., 1997) (“The wind is said to carry the benefits beseeched by the
prayer imprinted on the fluttering flag, both to the person who flies the flag and to all beings
in the region.”).
73. Johnson I, 2010 WL 768856 at *3. One could argue that most students would not
recognize the flags as prayer flags and therefore would not consider them religious displays,
One could just as easily argue that most students would recognize the historical context of the
statements on Johnson’s banners and therefore not consider the banners religious displays.
Furthermore, it seems likely that even if the typical American teenager would not recognize the
prayer flags as religious relics, he or she would recognize the images of Buddha as religious
symbols.
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Establishment of a minority religion is no more constitutional than
establishment of a majority religion.74
B. Removing Displays as an Act of Hostility
The Ninth Circuit incorrectly rejected the argument that the
school district’s removal of Johnson’s banners conveyed hostility toward Christianity. Viewed in isolation, the removal of the banners
does not convey hostility. But by permitting other teachers to maintain exhibits featuring other religious traditions, the school district’s
actions have the appearance of singling out Christianity for negative
treatment.
Addressing Johnson’s claim, the Ninth Circuit held that Poway’s
order to remove Johnson’s banners satisfied the Lemon test and thus
did not violate the Establishment Clause.75 First, the court identified
Johnson’s banners as a potential violation of the Establishment
Clause and held that the school district therefore had a valid secular
purpose in ordering their removal.76 Next, the court reasoned that by
attempting to avoid Establishment Clause claims, the school district
was “maintain[ing] the very neutrality the Clause requires . . . .”
Therefore, the school district’s action “neither has a primary effect of
advancing or inhibiting religion nor excessively entangles government with religion.”77
The question of whether Poway School District violated the Establishment Clause by removing Johnson’s banners depends on if the
school district risked a potential Establishment Clause claim by allowing Johnson’s banners to remain. The court held that it did, but
did not explain how it arrived at this conclusion.78 The court noted
only that the phrases on Johnson’s banners, “as organized and displayed . . . convey[ed] a religious message,”79 and that government
speech regarding religion violates the Establishment Clause only
when it “turns stigmatic or coercive.”80 Because the Ninth Circuit offers no additional clarification, it appears—whether this is the case or

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
Johnson II, 658 F.3d at 972.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 973.
Id. at 965.
Id. at 972.
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not—that the court found Johnson’s banners to be “stigmatic or
coercive” simply because they were calculated to “convey a religious
message.”81
Under this standard, the Tibetan prayer flags also raise a potential Establishment Clause issue. Unlike Johnson’s banners, prayer
flags do not present secular material in a way that conveys a religious
message. Rather, they present religious material displayed for a secular purpose.82 But Establishment Clause jurisprudence suggests that
“any display of an overtly religious symbol, such as the Ten Commandments or a Latin cross, seems to trigger the suspicion that the
purpose is not secular.”83 Although the public may not equate Tibetan prayer flags with religious symbols as they would the Ten Commandments or a cross, it seems reasonable to conclude that a typical
high school student would recognize the images of Buddha on the
flag as religious symbols. And while the symbols may be those of a
minority religion, there is no reason to think that such a display cannot convey a religious message and violate the Establishment
Clause.84
The Ninth Circuit cited its decision in Vasquez v. Los Angeles
County85 to support the conclusion that Poway did not violate the
Establishment Clause by ordering the removal of Johnson’s banners.86 However, Vasquez does not necessarily support the removal of
the banners. In that case, a city employee argued that Los Angeles
showed hostility to Christianity by removing an image of a cross, said
to represent the California missions, from its city seal.87 Although the
court in Vasquez upheld the removal of the cross from the seal, it did
not address what would happen if the city had removed one religious
symbol while allowing other religious symbols to remain.88 The

81. Id.
82. The secular purpose in this instance—“to stimulate scientific interest,” id. at 974—
more closely resembles the secular purpose of Johnson’s display than it does a clearly valid secular purpose such as the use of the Bible in an English literature class. See Illinois ex rel.
McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 236 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring).
83. Dokupil, supra note 13, at 630.
84. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 634 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (rejecting the contention “that it would be implausible for the city to endorse a faith
adhered to by a minority of the citizenry”).
85. 487 F.3d 1246 (9th Cir. 2007).
86. Johnson II, 658 F.3d at 970–71.
87. Vasquez, 487 F.3d at 1247–48.
88. See id. at 1248.
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Ninth Circuit correctly relied on Vasquez to conclude that removal
of a religious symbol is not a per se demonstration of hostility to religion. However, the court failed to take the necessary step of addressing the facts in Johnson, in which the government removed
symbols of one religion while allowing symbols of other religions to
remain. Specifically, the court failed to recognize that a reasonable
observer would likely conclude that this selective removal of one religious symbol is an act of hostility.
C. Permitting Displays as an Act of Endorsement
The Ninth Circuit also failed to consider that allowing other religious exhibits to remain would likely be interpreted as an unconstitutional endorsement of religion. The court began its response to
Johnson’s claim that the district had endorsed other religions by allowing other teachers to maintain their religious and antireligious
messages89 by stating that “[s]imply having religious content or
promoting a message consistent with a religious doctrine does not
run afoul of the Establishment Clause.”90 Although the court conceded that many displays throughout the school district, including
the prayer flags, “have some religious connotation,”91 it was quick to
assert that there was no indication that these displays were “used to
endorse or inhibit religion.”92
To arrive at this conclusion regarding the prayer flags, the court
noted that (1) the teacher who displayed the flags claimed to be unaware of their religious meaning, (2) none of the teacher’s students
had ever identified the flags as religious, and (3) the teacher had a
secular purpose for displaying the flags.93 Based on these facts, the
court held that “[t]hough the flags may . . . represent the Buddhist
faith, their use by the school district has nothing to do with their religious connotation. Instead, the evidence in this case demonstrates
that the school district uses the flags to stimulate interest in science
and scientific discovery without any mention of religion.”94 The
89. For a list of these other displays, see supra note 25 and accompanying text.
90. Johnson II, 658 F.3d at 973 (alteration in original) (quoting Johnson I, No.
07cv783 BEN (NLS), 2010 WL 768856, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2010) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 974.
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court reasoned that the context of the display further supported this
conclusion by neutralizing any religious message.95
Of course, Johnson’s display is permissible under similar reasoning. Johnson knew that his banners had religious significance;96 however, the court explicitly stated that a teacher’s intent was not dispositive.97 Neither the district court nor the Ninth Circuit indicated
that any of Johnson’s students had identified the banners as religious. (In fact, the record states that Johnson displayed his banners
for twenty years with no complaints.)98 Any coercive effect that the
banners may have had on students is purely speculative.
Additionally, Johnson had a secular purpose for displaying his
banners.99 The context of the statements on Johnson’s display provides further evidence of their secular purpose. Students exposed to
Johnson’s banners would almost certainly be aware of the secular
origins of their text: even a student who did not know the statements
could be found in the Declaration of Independence, on currency, or
in well-known patriotic songs could not possibly ignore the fact that
one of the phrases was taken from the Pledge of Allegiance, which
the school’s students recite every day.100 It seems inconsistent to
claim that the words “under God” are not coercive when the school
directs the students to recite them,101 and yet they become coercive
when hung silently on a classroom wall. And, as the district court
noted, any potential coercion behind Johnson’s banner would be
further offset by “the cacophony of other First Amendment speech
which remains in the high school classrooms.”102
Just as it correctly held that Poway School District could order
the removal of Johnson’s banners without violating the Establish-

95. Id.
96. See id. at 959.
97. See id. at 974 (“[B]ecause the speech is the government’s, Brickley’s purpose is not
dispositive.”).
98. Johnson I, No. 07cv783 BEN (NLS), 2010 WL 768856, at *17 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 25,
2010).
99. See Johnson II, 658 F.3d at 959.
100. POWAY UNIFIED SCH. DIST., ANNUAL NOTIFICATION OF PARENTS’/STUDENTS’
RIGHTS 3 (2010), available at http://www.powayusd.com/enrollment/10-11FORMS/
English/Annual_Notification_%20ParentStuRights_ENG_10_11Final.pdf.
101. Although district policy allows students to opt out of reciting the Pledge, those who
do so will still likely hear the offending words every morning. See id.
102. Johnson I, 2010 WL 768856 at *13.
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ment Clause,103 the court correctly held that the school district could
allow the prayer flags and other displays to remain in classrooms
without violating the clause. However, the court failed to address the
reasons for allowing these displays to remain while at the same time
ordering the removal of Johnson’s banners.
V. CONCLUSION
By itself, the Ninth Circuit’s holding that Poway School District
was justified in removing Johnson’s banners is not problematic. Neither is the court’s holding that the prayer flags and other displays
were permissible. But considered together, the two holdings raise serious concerns of religious discrimination. A reasonable observer
could certainly interpret these actions as displaying hostility to Johnson’s Christian message while endorsing other religious messages,
even if the school district did not intend such an effect.104
The Ninth Circuit’s decision to allow Poway to selectively permit
religious displays is not unprecedented.105 But the relevant decision
was clearly based on key distinctions between the physical settings of
the displays rather than their underlying messages.106 In Johnson,
there were no such distinctions—both the banners and the prayer
flags were similarly displayed and in similar settings.107
Currently, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence does not provide
clear standards for lower courts to apply in religious display cases.108
But the Court has unambiguously required government neutrality in
matters of religion.109 In future cases, a court could reasonably interpret Supreme Court precedent to allow either a restrictive or a
permissive approach to these cases. But whichever approach a court
chooses, the neutrality standard requires that the court apply the
same standard to all displays that it considers. In Johnson, the Ninth

103. See supra Part IV.B.
104. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
105. In County of Allegheny v. ACLU, the Supreme Court upheld the display of an eighteen-foot menorah while finding a nativity scene unconstitutional. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
106. The menorah was displayed outside and next to a forty-five-foot Christmas tree; in
contrast, the nativity scene was displayed alone and in a prominent location inside the courthouse. Id. at 580–82.
107. See supra notes 64–66 and accompanying text.
108. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
109. Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 696 (1994).
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Circuit failed to do so; therefore, Johnson was wrongly decided and
should be overruled.
Eric Jeppsen

 J.D. candidate, April 2013, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young
University.
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